The After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine in Title VII Cases and the Challenge Presented by \u3ci\u3eWallace v. Dunn Construction Co.\u3c/i\u3e, 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992) by Muth, William M., Jr.
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 72 | Issue 1 Article 9
1993
The After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine in Title VII
Cases and the Challenge Presented by Wallace v.
Dunn Construction Co., 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir.
1992)
William M. Muth Jr.
University of Nebraska College of Law, william.muth@cnhind.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
William M. Muth Jr., The After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine in Title VII Cases and the Challenge Presented by Wallace v. Dunn Construction
Co., 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992), 72 Neb. L. Rev. (1993)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol72/iss1/9
Note
The After-Acquired Evidence
Doctrine in Title VII Cases and the
Challenge Presented by Wallace v.
Dunn Construction Co., 968 F.2d
1174 (11th Cir. 1992).
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction ................................................ 330
II. The History of the Controversy ............................ 332
A. Summers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co . ..................................................... 332
B. Summary Judgment Granted in Title VII Cases ....... 335
C. Cases in Which Summary Judgment has been Denied. 336
1. The Least Serious Threat: Milligan-Jensen v.
Michigan Technological University ................. 336
2. The Mixed-Motive Case: Price Waterhouse v.
H opkins ............................................ 339
D. The 1991 Civil Rights Act .............................. 342
III. Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co .......................... 343
A. Facts of the Case ....................................... 343
B. The Court's Reasoning ................................. 343
1. Summers Misinterpreted the Mt. Healthy
Principle ............................................ 343
2. Employers Will Have the Incentive to Hire
Employees with Knowledge of the Employee's
Prior M isconduct ................................... 346
IV. Conclusion ................................................. 348
I. INTRODUCTION
The Tenth Circuit endorsed the application of the after-acquired
evidence doctrine as an affirmative defense in Title VII cases in 1988.1
Until the Eleventh Circuit decision in Wallace v. Dunn Construction
Copyright held by NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
1. Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988).
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Co.,2 employers were quite successful in winning summary judgment
motions based on evidence of employee misconduct that was discov-
ered after the employee's termination and was unrelated to the em-
ployer's reasons for terminating the employee.3
A hypothetical situation involving the after-acquired evidence doc-
trine may help to explain why the defense has been so controversial
and received so much attention in the last four years.4 A typical after-
acquired evidence doctrine scenario begins with an employee who is
terminated by his or her employer for reasons that the employee feels
are discriminatory under Title VII. Subsequently, the employee
brings a lawsuit against the employer. During the pretrial discovery
process, the employer discovers that the employee lied on his applica-
tion about his criminal record or another material qualification. The
employer then makes a motion for summary judgment on the grounds
that the employee either would not have been hired or would have
been fired because of the misrepresentation, and thus has no right to
recover damages for losing a job to which the employee was never en-
titled. Courts often grant the employer's summary judgment motion.5
2. 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992).
3. See, e.g., Bonger v. American Water Works, 789 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1992);
Benson v. Quanex Corp., 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 743 (E.D. Mich. March
24, 1992); Churchman v. Pinkerton's Inc., 756 F. Supp. 515 (D. Kan. 1991);
O'Driscoll v. Hercules, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 656 (D. Utah 1990); Carrol v. City of
Chicago, No. 87 C 8995,1990 WL 37631 (N.D. Ill. March 21, 1990); Mathis v. Boeing
Military Airplane Co., 719 F. Supp. 991 (D. Kan. 1989).
4. The number of cases construing the doctrine has increased each year since its
introduction into Title VII cases by Summers. In 1992 alone, three federal circuit
courts of appeal and several federal district courts invoked the doctrine. See Mil-
ligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological Univ., 975 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1992); Wal-
lace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992); Washington v. Lake
County, Ill., 969 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1992); Johnson v. Honeywell Information Sys.,
Inc., 955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992); Kravit v. Delta Air Lines, 60 Fair Emp. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 994 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 1992); Ikpoh v. Central DuPage Hosp., No. 90 C
7146, 1992 WL 211074 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 1992); McKennon v. Nashville Banner
Publishing Co., 797 F. Supp. 604 (M.D. Tenn. 1992) (doctrine was applied to
ADEA rather than Title VII); Bonger v. American Water Works, 789 F. Supp.
1102 (D. Colo. 1992); Benitez v. Portland Gen. Elec., No. CV 91-864-PA, 1992 WL
278104 (D. Or. March 31, 1992); Benson v. Quanex Corp., 58 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 743 (E.D. Mich. March 24, 1992); O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter
Co., 784 F. Supp. 1466 (D. Ariz. 1992); DeVoe v. Medi-Dyn, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 546
(D. Kan. 1992).
5. This fact pattern is analogous to some of the cases that have applied the after-
acquired evidence doctrine in Title VII cases. See, e.g., Benson v. Quanex Corp.,
58 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 743 (E.D. Mich. March 24, 1992). However, it is
only one of a number of potential fact patterns to which the doctrine is applica-
ble. Employers have been granted summary judgment in several cases where the
employee lied about something other than his or her criminal record. See Bonger
v. American Water Works, 789 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1992)(employee lied about
education); Churchman v. Pinkerton's Inc., 756 F. Supp. 515 (D. Kan. 1991)(em-
ployee lied about previous terminations for cause); O'Driscoll v. Hercules, Inc.,
1993]
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The after-acquired evidence doctrine enjoyed wide acceptance with
only minimal resistance 6 until the Eleventh Circuit handed down its
decision in Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co.7 The Wallace court ex-
pressly rejected the Tenth Circuit's reasoning from the seminal case
regarding the doctrine, Summers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co.8 The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Wallace has thrown
the use of the after-acquired evidence doctrine into complete turmoil.
The Wallace decision does raise some valid legal and theoretical
questions about the use the after-acquired evidence doctrine. How-
ever, the arguments in Wallace are somewhat suspect given the wide
support the Summers doctrine has received.9 Future decisions ad-
dressing and implementing Wallace will hopefully serve to solidify
the logically sound reasoning behind the after-acquired evidence doc-
trine, leading to its general acceptance in courts throughout the
nation.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE CONTROVERSY
A. Summers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
A well-established principle of agency and contract law is that an
employee cannot prevail in an action for wrongful discharge where
the employee committed acts that would have been cause for termina-
tion, regardless of whether the employer knew of those acts at the
time of the discharge.10 It is not material in such cases whether the
employer knew of the grounds that in fact existed at the time of the
discharge; the employer may avail itself of the employee's misconduct
and use that misconduct as an affirmative defense to the employee's
claim, notwithstanding its ignorance."1 This same principle, known as
the "after-acquired evidence" doctrine, has recently been extended to
situations involving summary judgment on claims of discriminatory
745 F. Supp. 656 (D. Utah 1990) (employee lied about age). Additionally, the mis-
conduct on which the employer bases the after-acquired evidence defense may
have occurred during the plaintiff's course of employment. See Summers v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988).
6. See Washington v. Lake County, Ill., 969 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1992); Milligan-Jensen
v. Michigan Technological Univ., 767 F. Supp. 1403 (W.D. Mich. 1991), rev'd, 975
F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1992) and discussion infra notes 34-57 and accompanying text.
7. 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992).
8. 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988).
9. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 24-28.
10. See, e.g., Leahey v. Federal Express Corp., 685 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Va. 1988); Ma-
sonite Corp. v. Handshoe, 44 So. 2d 41 (Miss. 1950); Barret v. ASARCO Inc., 763
P.2d 27 (Mont. 1988); Kilian v. Ferrous Magnetic Corp., 280 N.Y.S. 909 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1935); Marnon v. Vaughan Motor Co., 219 P.2d 163 (Or. 1950).
11. Benson v. Quanex Corp., 58 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 743 (E.D. Mich. March
24, 1992).
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discharge brought under Title VII and state civil rights laws.12
The first major case to apply the "after-acquired evidence" doc-
trine to a Title VII claim was Summers v. State Farm Mutual Automo-
bile Insurance Co.13 The plaintiff in Summers brought a claim for age
and religious discrimination after he was discharged for his alleged
poor attitude, inability to get along with others, and other work-re-
lated problems. The employee had previously been suspended for fal-
sification of records, but State Farm did not cite the falsifications as
one of the reasons for the employee's termination.' 4
Four years after the employee's termination and while preparing
for trial, State Farm discovered 150 additional falsifications in the em-
ployee's files. The employee, when confronted, did not deny the falsi-
fications. On the basis of the after-acquired evidence, State Farm filed
a motion for summary judgment, alleging that the employee failed to
state a cause of action. The summary judgment motion was granted.'5
In reaching its decision, the Summers court developed a set of ele-
ments which the defendant employer must prove in order to prevail
on a summary judgment motion. The employer must demonstrate (1)
that the plaintiff was guilty of some misconduct of which the em-
ployer was unaware; (2) that the misconduct would have justified dis-
charge; and (3) that had the employer known of the misconduct, the
employer would indeed have discharged the plaintiff.16 "Whether the
misconduct is related to the plaintiffs claim is irrelevant."17
The Summers court applied the after-acquired evidence doctrine to
this Title VII case utilizing the rationale of the Supreme Court deci-
sion in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle.'S
The employer in Mt. Healthy discharged the plaintiff teacher for con-
duct that the teacher alleged was protected by the First and Four-
teenth Amendments. The Court found that while one of the reasons
cited for discharge was protected by the First Amendment, the other
incident was clearly not protected, and thus constituted a legitimate
ground for discharge.19
12. Ia
13. 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988).
14. Id at 702-03.
15. Id. at 703.
16. See id. at 708. These elements are most clearly established in O'Driscoll v. Hercu-
les, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 656 (D. Utah 1990).
17. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 797 F. Supp. 604, 608 (M.D. Tenn.
1992).
18. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
19. Id. at 282-83. The conduct for which the teacher was discharged included (1) the
conveyance of an internal memorandum concerning a possible dress code for
teachers to a disk jockey who announced the information on the air as a news
item and (2) obscene gestures made by the teacher to two female students. The
conveyance of the memorandum was protected conduct, but the obscene gestures
were not.
1993]
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The following language in the Mt. Healthy Court's opinion was
quoted in Summers and forms the basis of the reasoning behind the
application of the after-acquired evidence doctrine to Title VII cases:
A rule of causation which focuses solely on whether protected conduct played
a part, "substantial" or other wise, in a decision not to rehire, could place an
employee in a better position as a resulti.f the exercise of constitutionally
protected conduct than he would have occupied had he done nothing.. .The
constitutional principle at stake is sufficiently vindicated if such an employee
is placed in no worse a position than if he had not engaged in the conduct. A
borderline or marginal candidate should not have the employment question
resolved against him because of constitutionally protected conduct. But that
same candidate ought not to be able, by engaging in such conduct, to prevent
his employer from assessing his performance record and reaching a decision
not to rehire on the basis of that record, simply because the protected conduct
makes the employer more certain of the correctness of its decision.2 0
Thus, the policy behind the after-acquired evidence doctrine is that
the plaintiff could not have been injured by the employer's discrimina-
tion if the employer would not have hired or would have fired the
plaintiff for other misconduct of which the employer was unaware.21
The after-acquired evidence doctrine as applied in Summers does not
impact the prima facie claim of Title VII employment discrimina-
tion.22 Instead, the doctrine deals with the separate issue of whether,
in light of the employee's misconduct, the employee is entitled to dam-
ages for the employer's alleged discrimination against the employee.
Thus, the after-acquired evidence doctrine does not work to deny the
employee's cause of action by repudiating any wrong-doing by the em-
ployer. It does, however, completely bar the plaintiff's claim by show-
ing that the plaintiff is not deserving of any compensation for his
"injuries."23
20. Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700, 705-06 (10th Cir.
1988)(quoting Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-
86 (1977)).
21. Id. at 708. See also Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological Univ., 975 F.2d 302,
304-305 (6th Cir. 1992).
22. Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700, 708 (10th Cir.
1988)("[W]hile such after-acquired evidence cannot be said to have been a 'cause'
for [the plaintiff's] discharge... it is relevant to [the plaintiff's] claim of 'injury,'
and does itself preclude the grant of any present relief or remedy to [the plain-
tiff]."); See also Baab v. AMR Serv. Corp., No. 5:91 CV 2574, 1993 WL 4202, *12
(N.D. Ohio Jan. 6, 1993)("The after-acquired evidence doctrine stands for the
proposition that the [discharge] would have and should have occurred despite the
discrimination which allegedly occurred."); Punahele v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
756 F. Supp. 487, 490 (D. Colo. 1991)(stating that rather than dealing with the
elements that constitute liability for unlawful discrimination, the Summers
court faced the issue of whether the plaintiff was injured by unlawful
discrimination).
23. Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700, 708 (10th Cir. 1988).
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B. Summary Judgment Granted in Title VII Cases
The general formulation of the doctrine announced in Summers
has received widespread support in Title VII cases. Several courts
have granted summary judgment to the employer based on after-ac-
quired evidence of resume or application fraud by the employee. Sum-
mary judgment has been granted when the employee misrepresented
her criminal record,24 age,25 education 26 and previous terminations for
cause. 27 Additionally, at least two courts have granted summary judg-
ment in Title VII cases in which the employee committed an act dur-
ing his course of employment that would have justified termination.28
In each of the cases where summary judgment was granted, the plain-
tiff employee undisputedly made the alleged misrepresentations or
performed the alleged misconduct.29 The court in each case also
stated that the plaintiff's termination, in light of the misrepresenta-
tions, was not a genuine issue of fact.30
In addition to its application in Title VII cases, the after-acquired
evidence doctrine has also been successfully applied by employers to
cases based on state statutes that contained provisions similar to those
found in Title VII.3' Thus, the after-acquired evidence doctrine, as es-
24. Washington v. Lake County, Ill., 969 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1992); Kravit v. Delta Air
Lines, 60 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 994 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 1992); Benson v.
Quanex Corp., 58 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 743 (E.D. Mich. March 24, 1992).
25. O'Driscoll v. Hercules, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 656 (D. Utah 1990).
26. Bonger v. American Water Works, 789 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1992).
27. Churchman v. Pinkerton's Inc., 756 F. Supp. 515 (D. Kan. 1991); Dotson v. United
States Postal Serv., 794 F. Supp. 654 (E.D. Mich. 1991), asffd, 977 F.2d 976 (6th Cir.
1992), cerL denied, 113 S. Ct. 263 (1992); Carrol v. City of Chicago, No. 87 C 8995,
1990 WL 37631 (N.D. Ill. March 21,1990); Mathis v. Boeing Military Airplane Co.,
719 F. Supp. 991 (D. Kan. 1989).
28. Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988); O'Day
v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 784 F. Supp. 1466 (D. Ariz. 1992). See also
Powers v. Chicago Transit Auth., 890 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1989)(in which the plain-
tiff had somehow obtained defendant employer's privileged attorney-client infor-
mation. While not granting summary judgment, the court favorably cited
Summers, stating that the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff's acquisition of
a certain memorandum might raise questions about the plaintiff's ethical conduct
and thus was relevant to the plaintiff's right to injunctive relief).
29. See, e.g., O'Driscoll v. Hercules, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 656, 657 (D. Utah 1990).
30. See, e.g., id. at 660.
31. Johnson v. Honeywell Information Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992) (court
applied Summers to Michigan's Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act, holding that the
plaintiff's falsification of her educational background would have been proper
grounds for discharge by the employer); Baab v. AMR Serv. Corp., No. 5:91 CV
2574, 1993 WL 4202, *4 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 6, 1993)("In light of Ohio's general en-
dorsement of the federal courts' interpretation of anti-discrimination laws, the
Ohio Supreme Court's decision to apply the after-acquired evidence doctrine to
its anti-bias statutes... seems a logical conclusion."); O'Day v. McDonnell Doug-
las Helicopter Co., 784 F. Supp. 1466 (D. Ariz. 1992)(court held that the Summers
rationale should be applied to the Arizona Civil Rights Act, since Arizona courts
1993]
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tablished in Summers, has received broad support on both state and
federal civil rights claims.
C. Cases in Which the Summers Doctrine Has Been Questioned
Summers has been challenged on several occasions by courts refus-
ing to grant summary judgment to the employer in spite of the exist-
ence of after-acquired evidence pertaining to the plaintiff's
misconduct. Some of these decisions are not really an affront to Sum-
mers. Instead, these cases present different fact patterns which did
not lend themselves to disposition by summary judgment.3 2 Other
cases, however, offer a more direct challenge to the Summers
doctrine.3 3
1. The Least Serious Threat: Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan
Technological University
The court in Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological Univer-
follow the principle that federal Title VII case law is persuasive in interpreting
Arizona anti-discrimination law); O'Driscoll v. Hercules, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 656 (D.
Utah 1990)("Because of the soundness of the Summers approach and the absence
of contrary indications, this court is of the opinion that the Utah State Supreme
Court would apply Summers.. ."). But see Bazzi v. Western and Southern Life
Ins. Co., 808 F. Supp. 1306, 1310 (E.D. Mich. 1992)(differentiating the Michigan
Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act from Title VII, thus limiting the scope of the after-
acquired evidence doctrine in cases brought under Elliot-Larsen); Flesner v.
Technical Communications Corp., 575 N.E.2d 1107 (Mass. 1991)(The Massachu-
setts state court seemed reluctant to enforce the doctrine, but did not state that
the rule was not valid. The court did refuse to grant summary judgment to the
defendant because there was a factual dispute over whether the employer would
have discharged the plaintiff in light of the after-acquired evidence).
It may be important to note that all the decisions in which summary judgment
was granted on a state civil rights act claim were handed down by federal courts
that could only estimate what the state court would do in the same situation. No
state court to date has strictly enforced the Summers doctrine on a state civil
rights act claim.
32. See, e.g., DeVoe v. Medi-Dyn, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 546, 553 (D. Kan. 1992)("[G]enuine
issues of fact remain regarding whether plaintiff's problems were so severe as to
foreclose the possibility that defendant would have hired him in any event.");
Punahele v. United Air Lines, 756 F. Supp. 487 (D. Colo. 1991)(court held that
whether a pardoned conviction would have made a difference in the employer's
decision not to hire the employee was a genuine issue of material fact); Flesner v.
Technical Communications Corp., 575 N.E.2d 1107 (Mass. 1991) (court refused to
grant summary judgment because disposition of the issue depended on disputed
issues of material fact involving the employer's motive or intent).
33. In addition to the cases discussed infra notes 34-107 and accompanying text, con-
sider Benitez v. Portland Gen. Elec., No. CV 91-864-PA, 1992 WL 278104 (D. Or.
March 31, 1992), where the district court judge refused to dismiss the plaintiff's
Title VII claim in spite of after-acquired evidence of the plaintiff's application
fraud "[in view of the absence of Ninth Circuit precedent, and the harshness of
the result..."). Id at *7.
[Vol. 72:330
1993] AFTER ACQUIRED EVIDENCE
sity34 evinced a reluctance to enforce the after-acquired evidence doc-
trine by attempting to distinguish Summers. Although the Sixth
Circuit reversed the district court's decision in Milligan,35 the case
warrants a brief discussion. Milligan was reversed on the basis of the
decision in Johnson v. Honeywell Information Systems.3 6 Conse-
quently, the Sixth Circuit never reached the merits of the reasoning of
the district court decision that denied the employer's motion for sum-
mary judgment.37 Since the arguments and holding in the district
court's decision could appear in subsequent decisions in other courts,
they will be dealt with here.
The plaintiff in Milligan alleged a Title VII sex discrimination vio-
lation against the employer. The court found that the defendant had
indeed discriminated against the plaintiff, but there was also proof
that the plaintiff had made a material falsification about her criminal
record on the employment application.3 8
The Milligan court refused to directly apply the rationale of Sum-
mers. The court held that the two cases could be distinguished be-
cause while no discrimination was found to have occurred in
Summers, there had already been proof of discrimination in the Milli-
gan case.39 This distinction makes little sense since the Summers
court expressly stated that it was making its decision assuming "that
State Farm was motivated, at least in part, if not substantially, because
of Summers' age and religion."40 Additionally, the Summers court
equated the plaintiff's case with the following hypothetical:
[A] company doctor is fired because of his age, race, religion, and sex and the
company, in defending a civil rights action, thereafter discovers that the dis-
charged employee was not a "doctor" ... the masquerading doctor would be
34. 767 F. Supp. 1403 (W.D. Mich. 1991), rev'd, 975 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1992).
35. Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological Univ., 975 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1992).
36. 955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992). The Johnson decision was handed down by the Sixth
Circuit subsequent to the district court's decision in Milligan. Since the Sixth
Circuit expressly adopted the Summers after-acquired evidence doctrine in John-
son, the reversal of Milligan was almost automatic. See Milligan-Jensen v. Michi-
gan Technological Univ., 975 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1992)(the Sixth Circuit stated that
the Johnson decision precluded the district court judge's approach in Milligan
and required that the case be reversed).
37. Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological University, 975 F.2d 302 (6th Cir.
1992).
38. Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological Univ., 767 F. Supp. 1403, 1413-14
(W.D. Mich. 1991), rev'd, 975 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1992).
39. 1d at 1416.
40. Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700, 708 (10th Cir. 1988); see
also Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1178 (11th Cir. 1992)(the court
stated that "the Summers case fashioned a rule that an employer may avoid all
liability for a discharge based solely on unlawful motives" by providing after-ac-
quired evidence of employee misconduct); Mathis v. Boeing Military Airplane
Co., 719 F. Supp. 991, 994 (D. Kan. 1989)("[Ihe Summers court specifically as-
sumed that the employee was dismissed in part due to his age and religion." (em-
phasis in original)).
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entitled to no relief, and Summers is in no better position.4 1
Thus, the argument that the Milligan decision can be distinguished
because there was an actual finding of discrimination is not persua-
sive. The Summers court was quite explicit in stating that it, too, was
applying the after-acquired evidence doctrine with the assumption
that the employer had discriminated against the plaintiff.42
The Milligan court went yet another step. The court held that it
was striking a middle ground by refusing to deny relief to a plaintiff
who was found to have been wronged, but not fully rewarding a plain-
tiff found to have falsified her employment application.43 Thus, the
Milligan court struggled with the questions of how the after-acquired
evidence of the plaintiff's application fraud should affect the plaintiff's
rewards of back pay, prejudgment interest and front pay.44 Eventu-
ally, the court decided to award back pay the plaintiff would have
made in her position with the defendant, minus mitigation, and re-
duced by 50 percent. 45
The arbitrary formula developed by the district court in Milligan is
clearly not the ultimate solution to the after-acquired evidence contro-
versy.46 The district court offered very little in terms of substantial
reasoning behind the formula, even admitting that it was simply
guessing the date on which the employer would have discovered the
falsification.47 Obviously, a more logical and substantive reason must
be established in order to deny the employer's right to summary judg-
ment based on the after-acquired evidence doctrine.
41. Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700, 708 (10th Cir. 1988).
42. Id.
43. Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological Univ., 767 F. Supp. 1403, 1417 (W.D.
Mich. 1991), rev'd, 975 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1992).
44. Id Ironically, just before stating the formula for determining the award, the
court stated that "In attempting to make the plaintiff whole, the court is left to
the futile task of guessing when, if ever, defendant would have discovered the
falsification. The court cannot speculate as to what this date would have been"
(emphasis added).
45. Id
46. See Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological University, 975 F.2d 302 (6th Cir.
1992)(in the case that reversed the district decision, the court referred to the dis-
trict court judge's decision as the "Solomon-like division of the baby," indicating
its dislike of the arbitrariness of the formula). But see Mitchell H. Rubinstein,
The Use of Predischarge Misconduct Discovered After an Employees' Termina-
tion as a Defense in Employment Litigation, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 28
(1990)("Perhaps there would be less conflict if some form of mitigation principle
were accepted. There is something wrong with a body of law which allows an
employer to cover up its illegal activities by searching an employee's past for un-
known falsifications.").
47. Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological University, 767 F. Supp. 1403, 1417
(W.D. Mich. 1991), rev'd, 975 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1992).
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2. The Mixed-Motive Case: Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
The United States Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hop-
kins48 announced a holding that at first glance appeared to weaken
the use of the after-acquired evidence doctrine in Title VII cases. The
case involved a plaintiff who alleged sex discrimination when she was
denied a promotion in favor of a male employee. The employer as-
serted a "mixed-motive" defense. The employer claimed that even if
the plaintiff proved that sex discrimination had played a part in the
employer's decision to promote the male employee, the plaintiff was
burdened with the additional requirement of showing that the promo-
tion decision would have been different had the employer not discrim-
inated.49 The plaintiff countered with an argument that if any
discrimination on the employer's part could be proven, the employer
should face liability under Title VII.50
The Court sided with the plaintiff, holding that Title VII was
meant to condemn employment decisions based on illegitimate consid-
erations, even if those misguided notions were mixed with legitimate
reasons for denying the promotion.5 1 A rule was announced which
stated:
[O]nce a plaintiff in a Title VII case shows that gender played a motivating
part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of liability
only by proving that it would have made the same decision even if it had not
allowed gender to play such a role [footnote omitted].5 2
Thus, one could draw the analogy from the Price Waterhouse holding
that an employer who fired a female employee because she was a poor
worker and because she was female would be liable for damages under
Title VII.
An employee who claimed a Title VII violation attempted to assert
that the Price Waterhouse holding rendered the Summers after-ac-
quired evidence doctrine useless in Punahele v. United Air Lines.5 3
The Punahele court, however, disagreed with the plaintiff's reading of
Price Waterhouse stating that Price Waterhouse "dealt solely with the
elements that constitute liability for forbidden employment discrimi-
nation."' 4 The Summers doctrine, on the other hand, was concerned
with determining whether the plaintiff was actually injured by the al-
leged discrimination.5 5
48. 490 U.S. 228 (1989)(Brennan, J., plurality).
49. Id- at 237-38.
50. Id- at 238.
51. I& at 241.
52. Id- at 244-45.
53. 756 F. Supp. 487 (D. Colo. 1991).
54. Id. at 490 (emphasis in original).
55. Id. See also O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 784 F. Supp. 1466, 1469
(D. Ariz. 1992)(explicitly endorsing the holding of the Punahele court); Grzenia v.
Interspec, Inc., No. 91 C 290, 1991 WL 222105, *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 1991)("After-
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Therefore, the presence of all the elements of a Title VII discrimi-
nation claim are irrelevant under the Summers doctrine. In deciding
whether summary judgment for the defendant is proper, the after-ac-
quired evidence is used solely for determining whether the plaintiff is
deserving of any damages for the discrimination that is assumed to
have been practiced against him or her.56
3. Washington v. Lake County, Illinois
Another case involving the mixed-motive doctrine was the Seventh
Circuit decision in Washington v. Lake County, IIL57 The plaintiff in
Washington alleged Title VII race discrimination when he was fired
from his job with the County Sheriff's Department. The employer
had stated in a letter to the plaintiff that he had been terminated for
bringing discredit to the department by being arrested for criminal as-
sault and because of twelve violations of department policy, including
insubordination and violation of jail security.58 After the plaintiff was
terminated, the employer discovered that the plaintiff had lied on his
employment application. One of the questions on the application
asked if the applicant had ever been convicted of a felony offense. The
plaintiff responded that he had not, despite prior convictions for crimi-
nal trespass and third-degree assault.59
In reaching its decision, the Washington court questioned whether
the Summers doctrine applied to the "would have fired" or "would not
have hired" standard or both.60 The Washington court attempted to
align itself with the decision in Bonger v. American Water Works6 ' by
analyzing the following language found in the latter case:
There are many situations, however, in which an employer would not dis-
charge an employee if it subsequently discovered resume fraud, although the
employee would not have been hired absent that resume fraud [footnote omit-
ted]. In such situations, the employee indeed would suffer injury if discharged
because of discrimination.6 2
The Bonger court granted the employer's motion for summary judg-
ment based on the finding that the employer would have discharged
the employee on the basis of the misconduct. The court did not, how-
ever, elaborate on its distinguishing of the "would not have hired" and
"would have fired" standards.6 3
acquired evidence is relevant in determining whether the plaintiff has been dam-
aged by an alleged discriminatory termination." (emphasis added)).
56. See cases cited supra, note 55.
57. 969 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1992).
58. Id- at 252.
59. I&
60. Id. at 253.
61. 789 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1992).
62. Id at 1106.
63. Id at 1107.
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The Washington v. Lake County, Illinois court chose to greatly ex-
pand the distinction between the "would have fired" and "would not
have hired" standards. The court stated that in the context of a case
where the plaintiff was discharged during the course of employment,
the only question that could be asked was whether the employer
would have fired the plaintiff in light of the after acquired evidence.64
An assertion by the employer that the employee would not have been
hired because of the after acquired evidence was considered "mis-
guided."65 Such an assertion was misguided, the court stated, because
the focus on whether the plaintiff would have been hired constituted
"an unjustified importation of 'property right' concepts into employ-
ment discrimination law."66 Since a property right in the plaintiff's
job was not a requirement for showing injury in a Title VII claim, the
court felt that the employer should not be allowed to assert the lack of
a property right as a defense. 67
In addition to the distinction between the "would not have hired"
and "would have fired" standards, the Washington court articulated
an argument similar to the "mixed-motive" argument discussed in
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.6S The Washington court's mixed-mo-
tive argument is a dramatic departure from the cases that have distin-
guished Price Waterhouse;69 however, the Seventh Circuit offers no
compelling arguments for application of the mixed-motive rule to the
after-acquired evidence doctrine. The court in Punahele v. United Air
Lines7 O adequately dealt with the mixed-motive arguments offered by
the Washington court,71 so those arguments need not be refuted
again.
Combining all these arguments, the Washington court stated as its
final rule that the employer's after-acquired evidence defense would
only be effective if the employer, "acting in a race-neutral fashion,
64. Washington v. Lake County, Ill., 969 F.2d 250, 255 (7th Cir. 1992).
65. Id. at 256.
66. Id. According to the Seventh Circuit, only a person who would not have been
hired has lost his "property right" in his employment with the defendant em-
ployer. Conversely, a employee who would have been fired for the misconduct
that constitutes the after-acquired evidence maintains his or her property right in
the job since that person honestly earned the position on his or her application.
The "property right" argument that relates to the "would not have hired" and
"would have fired" distinction is irrelevant to a construction of the after-acquired
evidence doctrine, unless the argument is related directly to the standing of the
plaintiff to bring the case. See discussion infra notes 87-95 and accompanying
text.
67. Washington v. Lake County, IlM., 969 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1992).
68. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). For an explanation of the mixed-motive argument and its
application to Title VII cases, see supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
69. O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 784 F. Supp. 1466 (D. Ariz. 1992);
Punahele v. United Air Lines, 756 F. Supp. 487 (D. Colo. 1991).
70. 756 F. Supp. 487 (D. Colo. 1991).
71. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
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would have fired the employee upon discovery of the misrepresenta-
tion."72 This rule applies the Price-Waterhouse mixed-motive analysis
and adds the additional stipulation that the employer cannot base its
defense on the fact that the plaintiff would not have been hired had
the employer known about the application fraud. The rule appears to
be too strict to overcome the body of case law that has allowed the
employer to assert that the plaintiff would not have been hired, even
though the plaintiff was terminated after he or she had begun working
for the employer.73
While the Washington court made no effort to distinguish or dis-
credit the Summers decision, the Washington decision still serves as a
blow to employers in the Seventh Circuit who try to assert the after-
acquired evidence defense. The holding in Washington revives the
school of thought that Summers will not be applicable to mixed-mo-
tive cases by requiring that the employer would have made the same
employment decision in a "discrimination-neutral" setting. The addi-
tional stipulation that the employer may not allege that the plaintiff
would not have been hired in light of the application fraud is a direct
affront to Summers, since the basis of the stipulation is that property
rights are not an element of injury in Title VII cases. Other courts
that have supported Summers have been consistent in holding that
whether the elements of injury are fulfilled is irrelevant to the after-
acquired evidence defense.74
D. The 1991 Civil Rights Act
Congress codified the mixed-motive holding in Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins through the 1991 amendments to Title VII. The applicable
subsection reads:
Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful employment
practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employ-
ment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.7 5
72. Washington v. Lake County, Ill., 969 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1992).
73. See, e.g., Johnson v. Honeywell Information Sys., 955 F.2d 409, 415 (6th Cir.
1992)(granting directed verdict for employer since employer "established that it
would not have hired [plaintiff] and that it would have fired her had it become
aware of her resume fraud during her employment."). Additionally, several fed-
eral district courts have granted summary judgment on the "would not have
hired" standard. See, e.g., Benson v. Quanex Corp., 58 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) Cases 743 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Dotson v. United States Postal Serv., 794 F.
Supp. 654 (E.D. Mich. 1991), aff'd 977 F.2d 976 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 263 (1992); Mathis v. Boeing Military Airplane Co., 719 F. Supp. 991 (D. Kan.
1989).
74. Punahele v. American Air Lines, 756 F. Supp. 487, 490 (D. Colo. 1991); O'Day v.
McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 784 F. Supp. 1466, 1469 (D. Ariz. 1992); Mathis
v. Boeing Military Airplane Co., 719 F. Supp. 991, 994 (D. Kan. 1989).
75. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m)(West Supp. 1992).
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Since a strict reading of the Summers version of the after-acquired
evidence doctrine was unaffected by the Price Waterhouse decision,
this statutory provision should not have any additional adverse ef-
fects.76 Regardless of whether an unlawful employment practice is es-
tablished, the fact remains that the after-acquired evidence doctrine
deals only with the question of whether the plaintiff is entitled to any
damages for the discriminatory practice. The statute should only af-
fect cases where the court determines that the employee would not
have been terminated in spite of the misconduct discovered after the
actual termination.77
III. WALLACE V. DUNN CONSTRUCTION CO.
A. Facts of the Case
The reasoning behind the Summers doctrine was explicitly re-
jected by the Eleventh Circuit in Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co.78
The plaintiff in Wallace alleged, among other claims, a hostile work
environment, a sexual harassment claim and a retaliatory discharge
under Title VII. During the deposition of the plaintiff, whose case was
being decided on interlocutory appeal, the defendant employer be-
came aware that the plaintiff had previously pled guilty to possession
of cocaine and marijuana. The plaintiff had lied on her application
when she omitted these convictions. The employer filed a motion for
partial summary judgment based on this after-acquired evidence, but
the trial court denied the motion.79 The Eleventh Circuit reversed the
decision of the trial court expressly rejecting the reasoning behind the
after-acquired evidence doctrine as established in Summers.80
B. The Court's Reasoning
1. Summers Misinterpreted the Mt. Healthy Principle
The Wallace court based its decision on several grounds. The first
flaw the Wallace court found in Summers was that the doctrine as
announced in Summers constituted an unwarranted extension of the
Mt. Healthy rule by ignoring the lapse of time between the employ-
ment decision and the discovery of a legitimate motive for that deci-
sion.81 The Wallace court felt that the Summers doctrine went one
76. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
77. See Douglas L. Williams & Julia A. Davis, Title VII Update - Skeletons and a
Double-Edged Sword, C669 ALI-ABA 303 (December 5, 1991)("[I]t appears likely
the after-acquired evidence defense will continue to be available to employers at
least on the issue of damages.").
78. 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992).
79. Id. at 1177.
80. Id. at 1179.
81. Id.
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step too far by "excus[ing] all liability based on what hypothetically
would have occurred absent the alleged discriminatory motive assum-
ing the employer had knowledge that it would not acquire until some-
time during the litigation arising from the discharge."8 2 This
doctrine, the court stated, clashed with the Mt. Healthy principle that
"the plaintiff should be left in no worse position than if he had not
been a member of a protected class."83
One of the employer's responses to this argument might be the un-
fairness of allowing an employee to lie and cheat his way into the job
and then allowing him to file a discrimination claim for losing a job to
which he was never really entitled. This argument is the fundamental
basis for the after-acquired evidence doctrine. At least one author,
however, feels that this fairness argument might be refuted by the
plaintiff by an assertion of estoppel.84 Under the estoppel theory, the
plaintiff would argue that because of the type of infraction or miscon-
duct, the employer's failure to investigate or even the passage of time,
the employer essentially waived its right to use the after-acquired evi-
dence as justification for termination.8 5 The argument is seriously
flawed. Decisions would reach the pinnacle of unfairness if the after-
acquired evidence defense was stripped from employers based on an
argument that since the employee was clever enough to hide the mis-
conduct for a long period of time, the employer should be estopped
from making a motion for summary judgment based on evidence of
the misconduct. Additionally, the fact that the employer was unaware
of the employee's misconduct is an essential element of the after-ac-
quired evidence defense.8 6 The plaintiff asserting an estoppel argu-
ment would have a difficult time overcoming the mass of case law that
views the after-acquired evidence defense as a logically sound
doctrine.
Another interesting argument for granting the employer's sum-
mary judgment motion in Wallace may be that the plaintiff did not
have standing to sue the employer due to her falsification on the em-
ployment application. According to the dissenting opinion in Wallace,
the enforcement of Title VII depends on the employee status of the
plaintiff.8 7 Congress intended that "employees" are the only pro-
82. Id. (emphasis in original).
83. Id.
84. Williams & Davis, supra note 77.
85. Id.
86. This element is rarely expressed, but it is implied by the language of the deci-
sions. See, e.g., Johnson v. Honeywell Information Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409, 412
(6th Cir. 1992)("Generally, an employer may defend a wrongful discharge claim
on the basis of facts unknown at the time discharge and, therefore, not an actual
or inducing motive for the termination.").
87. Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1187 (11th Cir. 1992)(Godbold, J.,
dissenting). See also Ikpoh v. Central DuPage Hosp., No. 90 C 7146, 1992 WL
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tected class under Title VII. Since the plaintiff in Wallace lied on her
job application, she never rightfully attained the status of an employee
for the purposes of Title VII. 8 If the plaintiff did not rightfully be-
come an employee, she was not a member of the protected class that
was allowed to sue, and her case should have been dismissed for lack
of standing.
The dissenting opinion's reasoning is very persuasive, but such a
result might create more problems than it would solve. Since the dis-
sent focuses on the fact that the plaintiff would not have been hired if
the employer had known of the application fraud, the controversy re-
turns to the fight over the distinction between the "would not have
hired" and "would have fired" criteria9 The dissenting opinion hints
at the same distinction between Wallace and Summers that the court
in Washington v. Lake County, 11.90 proposed. Both Washington and
the Wallace dissent rejected the Summers analysis that examined
only whether the plaintiff is entitled to relief since his or her employ-
ment would have ended before the employee's actual termination.91
Instead, both decisions would limit successful application of the doc-
trine; the Wallace dissent would limit the doctrine to cases in which
the plaintiff would not have been hired, while the Washington court
would limit the doctrine to cases where the plaintiff would have been
fired.92 The standing argument of the Wallace dissent is much more
persuasive than the Washington court's distinction between the
"would not have hired" and "would have fired" standards. In fact, the
standing argument appears to be an inherent part of the Summers
reasoning that the employee's misconduct bars the employee from
claiming any damages.93
However, neither the Wallace dissent nor the Washington decision
are sufficient as currently drafted. If courts are to focus on whether
211074, *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 1992)('Title VII contemplates some employment
relationship.").
88. Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1188 (11th Cir. 1992)(Godbold, J.,
dissenting)(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(A)). ("No order of the court shall
require ... the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an em-
!ployee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was refused
admission, suspended, or expelled, or was refused employment or advancement
or was suspended or discharged for any reason other than discrimination on ac-
count of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin or in violation of section
2000e-3(a) of this title." (emphasis added)).
89. See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
90. 969 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1992).
91. Courts adopting the Summers analysis generally enforce the after-acquired evi-
dence doctrine under both the "would not have hired" and "would have fired"
standards. See, e.g., Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological Univ., 975 F.2d
302, 304-05 (6th Cir. 1992) and cases cited supra note 73.
92. Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1185 (11th Cir. 1992)(Godbold, J.,
dissenting); Washington v. Lake County, Ill., 969 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1992).
93. See discussion infra note 108 and accompanying text.
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the employer would not have hired or would have fired the employee,
the effect on employers will be unfair and the after-acquired evidence
doctrine eroded. The doctrine should be expanded to include miscon-
duct that occurs at any time in the hiring and employment process. 9 4
Employee conduct that is grounds for termination should remove the
employee from the protected class under Title VII regardless of
whether the employee had already attained valid employment with
the employer.95 The distinction between the "would not have hired"
and "would have fired" standards makes little sense if the courts are
to focus on the standing of the employee to sue.
2. Employers Will Have the Incentive to Hire Employees with
Knowledge of the Employee's Prior Misconduct
Another argument on which the Wallace court based its decision
was the feeling that the Summers doctrine was a direct affront to the
purpose behind Title VII, since one of the purposes behind Title VII
was "to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlaw-
ful employment discrimination."96 The Eleventh Circuit reasoned
that the Summers rule which completely barred the plaintiff from re-
covery even in the presence of discriminatory practices by the em-
ployer was unjustified. Rather than giving employers the incentive to
eliminate discrimination, the Summers doctrine was alleged to invite
employers to establish outlandishly low thresholds for legitimate ter-
mination and avoid liability for discrimination by rummaging through
the plaintiff's records.97 Even more troubling to the Eleventh Circuit
was the incentive for employers to hire members of a protected class
with prior knowledge of a pre-existing reason for terminating the em-
ployee, mistreat the employee, and then to "discover" a legitimate rea-
son for termination during the ensuing litigation.98
This argument has been addressed in past decisions construing the
after-acquired evidence doctrine with much more logical reasoning
than the Wallace court provides. Those decisions concluded that the
danger of an employer combing through the employee's records for
94. The Sixth Circuit agrees with this proposition. See Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan
Technological Univ., 975 F.2d 302, 304-05 (6th Cir. 1992)("[I]f the plaintiff would
not have been hired, or would have been fired, if the employer had known of the
falsification, the plaintiff suffered no legal damage by being fired.").
95. The courts have enforced the after-acquired evidence doctrine in both instances.
See, e.g., Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir.
1988)(court enforced doctrine for conduct that occurred during the course of em-
ployment); Benson v. Quanex Corp., 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 743 (E.D.
Mich. March 24, 1992)(court enforced doctrine in application fraud case).
96. Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1179 (11th Cir. 1992)(quoting Al-
bemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975)).
97. Id. at 1180.
98. Id. at 1180-81. The court referred to this complex subversion as "sandbagging."
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any shred of incriminating evidence is minimal.99 The Wallace court's
concerns over the employer setting an abnormally low standard for
termination is not justified. Since the courts tend to look at the pat-
tern and practice of how employers treat employees who have com-
mitted similar improper acts,10 0 an employer would have to
systematically hire and fire several employees for very minor infrac-
tions in order to establish the low standard. It seems highly illogical
that an employer would engage in such a practice in hopes of getting
away with discrimination in the future.
Additionally, a few courts have shown a tendency to stray from the
usual subjective standardlol in these cases and have applied the objec-
tive "reasonable employer" standard to determine whether the em-
ployer would actually have terminated the employee.10 2 The proper
standard is probably a mixture of the objective and subjective stan-
dards. Courts should look at whether a reasonable employer in the
defendant's business would have terminated that employee in light of
the discovered misconduct. The standard must be somewhat subjec-
tive because different companies have different priorities regarding
the activities and qualifications of their employees. 03 The objective
restriction on the subjective standard will prevent the results from be-
coming too extreme when the after-acquired evidence defense is
strictly applied.104 Obviously, the concern of the Wallace court re-
99. See Johnson v. Honeywell, 955 F.2d 409, 414 (6th Cir. 1992)(requiring necessary
elements "to prevent an employer from combing a discharged employee's record
for evidence of any and all misrepresentations, no matter how minor or trivial, in
an effort to avoid legal responsibility for an otherwise impermissible discharge.").
See also Washington v. Lake County, IM., 969 F. 2d 250, 255-56 (7th Cir. 1992);
O'Driscoll v. Hercules, 745 F. Supp. 656, 659 (D. Utah 1990). Both cases contain
similar language to that found in Johnson. But see Mathis v. Boeing Military
Airplane Co., 719 F. Supp. 991, 995 (D. Kan. 1989)(stating that "in some cases a
strict application of the Summers holding may lead to extreme results.").
100. See O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 784 F. Supp. 1466, 1469 (D. Ariz.
1992)(court differentiated between other employee's conduct that did not lead to
termination and the misconduct that plaintiff committed); Mathis v. Boeing Mili-
tary Airplane Co., 719 F. Supp. 991, 995 (D. Kan. 1989)(employer offered evidence
that it had consistently fired employees for misconduct similar to that of the
plaintiff).
101. For cases that appear to apply a subjective standard by looking exclusively at the
practices of the defendant employer in that case, see Johnson v. Honeywell Infor-
mation Sys., 955 F.2d 409, 414 (6th Cir. 1992); O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas Heli-
copter Co., 784 F. Supp. 1466, 1468 (D. Ariz. 1992).
102. See Churchman v. Pinkerton's Inc., 756 F. Supp. 515, 521 (D. Kan. 1991);
O'Driscoll v. Hercules, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 656, 659 (D. Utah 1990).
103. See Baab v. AMR Serv. Corp., No. 5:91 CV 2574, 1993 WL 4202, *10 (N.D. Ohio
Jan. 6, 1993) ("[W]hile the condition of one's knees may be quite material to a
baggage handler, football player, or policeman on foot-patrol, that same condition
would likely be, as a matter of law and/or simple proof, inconsequential for a
book editor or accountant.").
104. This would help to alleviate the concern expressed by the court in Mathis v. Boe-
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garding the setting of an senselessly low standard for termination by
employers can be alleviated by implementing many of the ideas that
have already been expressed by other courts construing the doctrine.
Even more absurd than the "low standard" argument is the hypo-
thetical proposed by the Wallace court in which an employer
with a proclivity for unlawful motives [hires] a woman-despite knowledge of
a legitimate reason that would normally cause the employer not to employ
her-[destroys] any evidence of such knowledge, [pays] her less on the basis of
her gender, [sexually harasses] her until she protests, [discharges] her, and
["discovers"] the legitimate motive during the ensuing litigation, thus escaping
any liability for the unlawful treatment of the erstwhile employee. 10 5
Until a case comes along to indicate that an employer would even con-
sider such a complicated scheme, this argument has little practical
support. In past cases, employers have been surprised to find that the
employee defrauded them. Often the employer does not discover the
evidence for a long period of time after the litigation has begun,06 and
the employer has already incurred very substantial legal fees. Logic
would indicate that the risk and expense of having to face litigation,
along with the cost of preparing such an elaborate scheme, would pre-
vent an employer from attempting such an involved plan. If the court
is really worried about such a situation, the plaintiff should be allowed
to show that the employer was aware of the misconduct and did not
immediately terminate the employee. Since an essential element of
the defense is that the evidence was found after the actual termination
took place,107 it would not be unreasonable to make the employer
show that it had no knowledge of the misconduct prior to the
termination.
IV. CONCLUSION
The use of the after-acquired evidence doctrine in Title VII cases is
in a state of disarray and requires a more uniform formula. The courts
need to establish a system that keeps the essential elements of the
doctrine as established in Summers. This goal may be achieved by jus-
tifying the doctrine with a modified version of the standing justifica-
tion set forth in the dissenting opinion in Wallace.
Summary judgment is granted based on the after-acquired evi-
dence of employee misconduct because the employee is unable to
prove that he or she deserves any damages. The arguments proposed
by the courts that have questioned the reasoning behind the doctrine
ing Military Airplane Co., 719 F. Supp. 991, 995 (D. Kan. 1989), regarding the
harshness of the result caused by a strict application of Summers.
105. Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1180-81 (11th Cir. 1992).
106. See, e.g., Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir.
1988)(evidence was uncovered during pretrial discovery, four years after the ac-
tual termination).
107. See supra note 86.
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are flawed. The doctrine does not subvert the purposes of Title VII,
which purports to make the victim of discrimination whole. A plain-
tiff who has obtained employment through fraudulent means or who
has committed misconduct so egregious as to warrant dismissal cannot
justifiably stand in front of the court and claim standing as an "injured
employee." Since the plaintiff has no standing to bring a Title VII
case, the case is properly dismissed on a summary judgment motion.
It should not matter whether the employee would not have been hired
or would have been fired. The result is the same in both cases. The
employee has committed misconduct serious enough that for the pur-
poses of Title VII, he or she never rightfully attained the status of an
"employee." 08
Additionally, concerns about evil employers plotting to "set up" po-
tential discrimination victims with complex plans of mistreatment or
digging through the employee's past for any trivial piece of misconduct
can be alleviated by placing a relatively high burden of proof on the
employer. If the employer can prove that a reasonable employer in
the same business and circumstances as the defendant employer in the
pending case would have terminated the employee for the established
misconduct, summary judgment should be granted.
William M. Muth, Jr. '94
108. At least one court appears to have recognized the validity of this conclusion. See
Dotson v. United States Postal Serv., 794 F. Supp. 654, 659 (E.D. Mich. 1991), aff'd,
977 F.2d 976 (6th Cir. 1992), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 263 (1992)(holding that postal
employee who lied on his application about his medical history and previous ter-
minations for cause had disqualified himself from the position through his decep-
tion and could not recover for discrimination "when he was not initially entitled
to the job").
1993]

